Foreign Rebel Sponsorship: A Patron–Client Analysis of Party Viability in Elections Following Negotiated Settlements

Michael C. Marshall[1]

Abstract

This project examines long-term viability of former rebel parties in postconflict elections following negotiated settlements. Building on a growing literature examining the environmental and organizational factors affecting insurgent-to-party transformations and emergence, this project asks why some insurgent organizations remain politically viable as party labels in postsettlement environments while others do not, despite facing similar costs of entry. I propose that revenues from foreign patrons provide political opportunities to desperate rebel groups, easing their transition into viable political parties. However, I also propose that the connection between foreign sponsorship and rebel party development is not ironclad. Utilizing the principal–agent model and the two-level game, this piece argues that the political development of rebel clients may be constrained by the rational and institutional pressures that potential foreign patrons face. Using binary logit models and marginal effects postestimation, this piece finds that rebel parties with authoritarian patrons are more likely to regularly participate in national elections and accumulate governing power.

[1]Department of Political Science, Miami University of Ohio, Oxford, OH, USA

Corresponding Author:
Michael C. Marshall, Department of Political Science, Miami University of Ohio, Oxford, OH 45056, USA.
Email: marsham2@miamioh.edu

Negotiated settlements are often a desperate, last-ditch effort for rebels to survive following a protracted conflict, providing militant organizations a chance to join the political arena. Like the recent Colombian peace accord, postsettlement states combine high levels of rebel weariness for warfare with the strong hatred and contempt for the former by supporters of progovernment forces. Unlike rebel victories and defeats that place rebel groups on direct paths toward establishment and destruction, respectively, negotiated settlements provide some path for political transition and/or inclusion. Despite the limitations and costs of entry restricting many rebel organizations from participating in politics after negotiations end, some organizations not only emerge but also develop into viable competitors of postsettlement electoral systems. Why do some rebel organizations transition into political parties that remain relevant while others do not, despite having similar opportunities to do so?

Recently, there has been growing discussion on the transformative politics of negotiated settlements, particularly in determining which armed groups become political parties and the national-level effects of political inclusion. Indeed, the process of transforming armed groups into political parties is critical for peace and democracy (Carothers 2006; Reilly and Nordlund 2008; Marshall and Ishiyama 2016). Generally, the study of rebel-to-party transformation has been more path dependent: the experience of an organization in the prewar politics, the legacy effects of conflict, and the politics of conflict resolution influence leadership perceptions of success (Soderberg-Kovacs and Hatz 2016; Manning and Smith 2016). According to this reasoning, rebel leaders make rational choices based on the likelihood of attaining power in the new political order, while constrained by a postconflict environment.

A central limitation of the current literature is the lack of a systematic explanation for long-term rebel party viability. A viable political party (1) *participates* regularly in national elections and (2) *accumulates power* by placing candidates in national office (Janda 1980).[1] Another central limitation of the current literature is the lack of analysis regarding the role of foreign sponsors in rebel-to-party transformation. Although the importance of state-sponsored nonstate actors has increased in the civil war literature (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2011; Kalyvas and Ballcells 2010; Saleyhan et al 2014), these patron–client relationships have been missing in the rebel-to-party transition literature. Alternatively, this piece argues that sponsors provide access to financial and human capital that dramatically increase the long-term political opportunities of new rebel parties. Additionally, this piece argues that different sponsorship networks yield different levels of political opportunity, as individual patrons are constrained both by the principal–agent model and by their own institutions. Therefore, the long-term success of a former rebel political party depends largely on the regime types of sponsors in their patronage network.

Rebel-to-Party Transformations

Not all organizations are able to become political parties following a civil war, and an organization's capability to fight in a Guerilla War may not necessarily equate with electoral capabilities (Doyle and Sambanis 2006, Ishiyama and Batta 2011). Yet, as Manning (2008) and Allison (2016) argue, rebel groups are not much different from the other potential competitors transitioning in postconflict societies. Like any new political party, a rebel label's emergence is dependent upon solving the collective action problem (Reilly and Nordlund 2008; Klapidor 2009). Although some fighters of a rebel group may become members of a political party, most rebels return to their farms and businesses following the war, too uninterested in volunteering for something as mundane as campaigning (Doyle and Sambanis 2006).[2] Structurally, there rises an issue with transferable administrative skills and constituencies from bush bureaus to postconflict politics. Subnational-level scholars argue that the establishment of bush bureaucracy during war is akin to electoral capabilities in peace: organizations that regulate markets and establish rules of law should be better suited than warlords that extort their constituents (Weinstein 2007; Mampilly 2009).

Alternatively, a rebel party's capacity to transform may predate their time in the bush. Indeed, experience with democratic institutions before a civil war has been linked to the likelihood of party emergence following civil wars (De Zeeuw 2007; Manning 2008; Manning and Smith 2016). Organizations whose origins are connected to a prewar political party not only have the technical know-how required to transform but also have the leadership that will likely increased confidence of success in elections (Manning and Smith 2016). Likewise, organizations affiliated with legal political parties and activist organizations during the war may benefit from increased political legitimacy despite their behavior during the war (De Zeeuw 2007; Manning and Smith 2016).

Regardless of organizational legacy, rebel groups are constrained by the terms and conditions of the peace itself. Several scholars have noted the importance of the language in and the enforcement of a negotiated settlement on political development thereafter (see Brandt et al. 2011; Joshi 2013; Joshi and Darby 2013; Marshall and Ishiyama 2016). For rebel leadership, a particularly important issue in perceiving success is the settlement itself, especially features bargained into it involving electoral institutions and procedures (Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001). Generally speaking, proportional representation (PR, henceforth) provides easier access for new political competitors than plurality systems or high-threshold PR systems (Lijphart 1999; Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001; Downs 2011), but much of these opportunities are also driven by ballot structure too (Reynolds, Reilly, and Ellis 2005). Cammett and Malesky (2012) argue that parties that can form national lists are much easier to develop because the party is not burdened with recruiting candidates for individual districts. On the other hand, candidate lists like those used in plurality, majority, and single transferrable systems dramatically increase costs, requiring new political parties to develop candidate selection pools. Additionally,

many postsettlement election laws require parties to participate in every electoral district or face harsh penalties (Lijphart 1999; Reynolds, Reilly, and Ellis 2005; Downs 2011; Ishiyama and Marshall 2015). An inevitable consequence of rebranding and reshuffling new personalities is that candidates may not be the representatives of the natural constituencies that electrify a party's base (Dayton and Kreisberg 2009; Sindre 2014; Ishiyama and Marshall 2015).

Foreign Sponsorship: External Revenues Provide Political Opportunities

Foreign patrons back rebel organizations for many different reasons during civil wars. Some sponsors delegate clients to become revolutionary vehicles of change and democratization (Carothers 2006; Coyne 2008; Salehyan 2010). Some sponsors such as Cuba and the Soviet Union attempted to produce friendly governments and collective security (Vanneman and James 1983; Salehyan 2010). Additionally, some sponsors such as India, Saudi Arabia, and Iran use their clients as a means of destabilizing regional rivals or economic competitors. Additionally, security interests and power accumulation are timeless endeavors; even as conflicts end, many sponsors invest in the long-term success of their clients as political parties (Carothers 2006; Vanderhill 2013). However, foreign sponsorship is complicated as patron–client relationships change and complications arise from networks of patrons each placing their own demands upon a single client (Salehyan, Wood, and Siroky 2014).

All political parties require two things: "stuff" with which to build an organization and political support from some constituency, which involves linking the party with members of an electorate (Reilly and Nordlund 2008). This project builds on a very simple, yet generalizable argument: transforming a rebel organization into a viable political party is dependent upon overcoming the costs of entry, capturing loyal followers and rent-seekers from established governing parties (Hale 2006; Ishiyama and Batta 2011; Berti 2013; Manning and Smith 2016). Indeed, the transformation of a rebel group into a *viable* political party can be an expensive one, requiring organizations to capture revenue streams that are not readily available within many postconflict environments (Kang and Meernik 2005) but are required to form viable and sustainable political competitors (Reilly and Nordlund 2008).

Much like oil and diamonds are resources captured by rebels to sustain a conflict and solve the collective action problem, rebels must acquire financial and human capital to solve the collective action problem to become viable and sustainable political parties. Capturing and holding onto voting constituencies are particularly difficult following negotiated settlements.

First, rebels are at a distinct disadvantage during the transition and disarmament process, requiring them to give up their access to critical resources and capital for war that provides them selective incentives for recruitment (Doyle and Sambanis 2006). Disarmament dramatically increases the cost of association with a former rebel group, as the organization loses its ability to adequately respond to repression

and death squads but also faces severe audience costs and internal fragmentation if it chooses to slow disarmament (Dayton and Kreisberg 2009; Allison 2016). Second, even when organizations can receive security through a UN peacekeeping operation (UNPKO, henceforth), these organizations must entice a populous generally disenfranchised by wartime governance (Kang and Meernik 2005; Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Dayton and Kreisberg 2009). Third, rebels must challenge established political parties that need not invest in party structures or cadres, but like the rebels face limited financial capital in a postconflict environment (see Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Meernik and Kang 2005). Therefore, it is plausible that foreign-backed organizations should have access to revenues that rival established political parties, especially in the patronal politics of postsettlement states. These external revenues allow former rebel parties to compete for these constituencies through public goods provisions/services such as health care, education, and protection (Saint-Germain and Chavez-Metoyer 2009; Vanderhill 2013; Berti and Guittierez 2016).[3]

In addition to establishing connections to constituencies, party organizations require buildings, infrastructure, communications, and cash. Further, campaigns require resources, not only for personnel but also for advertisement, for media and for getting the party's message out: all of which in low supply and high demand following a civil war (Meernik and Kang 2005). Former rebel groups also need to rebrand a new identity through reformed platforms, new symbols, and the selection of moderate candidates (see Allison and Alvarez 2011; Ishiyama and Marshall 2015, 2017). Essentially, former insurgent groups need financial and human capital to market themselves to voters and opportunistic politicians as new competitive party labels rather than a revolutionary menace (Allison and Alvarez 2011; Ishiyama and Marshall 2015).[4]

Indeed, external revenues from foreign sponsors provide former rebel parties opportunities to invest into infrastructure and internal party capabilities, which are crucial for long-term competition. In addition to financial backing, foreign sponsorship provides a level of direct interaction between a patron's advisors and a client's leadership. These day-to-day interactions with foreign advisors play an essential role in the transfer of human capital as well as effective management of external revenues in these transitioning organizations (Vanneman and James 1983; Kalyvas and Ballcells 2010). Thus, it is plausible that former rebel labels will want to facilitate these interactions over time, to continue receiving political opportunities even when the leadership and platform of the organization change.

> **Hypothesis 1:** Former rebel parties with foreign sponsorship will be more viable in postsettlement politics than those without a foreign patron.

Foreign Sponsorship: Rational and Institutional Constraints of Patron Behavior

All foreign sponsors are constrained by the principal–agent model. As with all forms of principal–agent relationships, sponsorship carries with it certain risks that can

endanger both the agent and the principal if success is not achieved (Salehyan, Wood, and Siroky 2014; Eck 2015). *Adverse selection* refers to information asymmetry, as to the capabilities of the client organization and their reliability to follow a patron's contractual agreement (Saleyhan 2010). The degree of adverse selection affects the level of involvement of a principal. Agency slack refers to the behaviors of a proxy organization outside of the bounds of a contractual agreement after delegation (Salehyan 2010; Eck 2015). Agency slack dictates the willingness of a principal to break a contract. In Vanneman and James (1983) seminal work of the Angolan civil war, the Cuba's contract with the Peoples' Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA, henceforth) provides examples of both adverse selection and agency slack. Cuba's lack of knowledge in MPLA's military capabilities required them to take more responsibility against Portuguese forces and later against the National Union for Total Independent in Angola (UNITA, henceforth; Millar 1980). Although MPLA was well organized administratively, it was consistently outmaneuvered by UNITA and had lost control of much of the country between 1974 and 1991, thus leading to direct Cuban intervention (Millar 1980; Vanneman and James 1983). Despite Cuba's level of involvement, it suffered agency slack, in 1992, when MPLA made political concessions to the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA, henceforth) and UNITA and abandoned its revolutionary identity, shedding Marxist–Leninism for a prolabor mass party, democratic-socialist identity (Sagar 2009).

Informed by the principal–agent model, potential patrons form contractual agreements to constrain their clients (Salehyan 2010). As in any contractual agreement, patrons screen, monitor, and threaten clients to the acceptable behaviors of a covenant (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2011; Saleyhan 2010). Becoming the patron of a rebel movement is a high risk, high reward game for many statesmen. If well managed, patrons gain access to a nation's dialogue and influence within the borders of a state of interest. If adverse selection or agency slack occurs, patrons may face considerable audience costs domestically and internationally (Vanneman and James 1983; Salehyan 2010; Salehyan, Wood, and Siroky 2014). Depending on regime characteristics and level of risk acceptance, each patron likely allocates revenue and human capital differently, directly affecting the viability of former rebel labels for electoral competition.

Democratic Patrons and Revenue Micromanagement

For patrons operating in democracies, attempting to install a former rebel party into office is inherently undemocratic behavior, dramatically increasing the costs of adverse selection and agency slack; especially when that aggression targets other democracies (Russett and Oneal 1999; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Indeed, democratic political institutions, such as elections, media, and separation of powers, dramatically increase the costs of conducting risk-acceptant foreign policy decisions (Putnam 1988). Additionally, these patrons may also face executive constraints that

limit the speediness, robustness, and ultimately their perseverance toward risky policy decisions like sponsorship (Putnam 1988; Russett and Oneal 1999). Furthermore, patrons in democratic polities are accountable to large selectorates that must be mobilized to ensure political survival (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2012). Understanding the risks of principal–agent agreements, democratic patrons will likely micromanage their agreements, attempting to limit the potential audience costs associated with foreign sponsorship. Although these strategies help protect the patron, they may hinder the development of the client.

One strategy democratic patrons use is asset micromanagement. Some democratic patrons, such as the United States, France, and India, establish binding contracts with individual assets than with complex organizations (Vanneman and James 1983; Salehyan 2010; Salehyan, Wood, and Siroky 2014). Micromanaging one individual with a binding contract allows a patron to sever ties with a client in an efficient manner, whether they satisfy the terms of the agreement or not (Hale 2006; Salehyan 2010). Although this strategy increases a sponsor's ability to exit a principal–agent situation, it does not actively protect the patron from long-term agency slack such as terroristic violence or realignment with an enduring rival (Coyne 2008).

Micromanagement can also take on the form of democratic assistance. Unlike installing a former rebel party in government, sponsoring macrolevel democratization is well within the acceptable behaviors of potential democratic patrons. It is generally accepted that these potential patrons have an incentive to spread democratic institutions and governance, reducing the likelihood of a number of security risks in the process (Russett and Oneal 1999; Gleditsch and Ward 2006). Sponsoring NGOs for voter education and observers for electoral processes is an easier pill to swallow than biased sponsorship of a specific asset or a former militant organization.

Unlike their democratic counterparts, autocratic patrons are not constrained by the same institutions that inhibit democracies (Putnam 1988; Kitschelt 1994; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2012). Autocratic leaders do not have large selectorates that they are beholden or accountable to, neither do they have strong veto players that place constraints on executive foreign policy choices (Putnam 1988). These patrons operate in a lower risk, higher reward principal–agent environment, allowing them to be risk acceptant in sponsorship agreements. Additionally, authoritarian states have the most to lose if they do not "have a horse" in a democratic race, due to the direct security threats that arise from democratization (Greig and Enterline 2008, 2014). Indeed, autocratic patrons also possess the administrative relations and institutional skill sets in high demand in the patronal conditions of transitional politics (Kitschelt 1994; Ishiyama 1999, 2001; Hale 2006; Kalyvas and Ballcells 2010; Svolik 2012) and have security interests that make it worth sharing them to new client parties (Greig and Enterline, 2008; Carothers 2006; Vanderhill 2013).[5] For these patrons and their small selectorates, the potential utility of foreign sponsorship may be well worth the costs to revenue and manpower.

Hypothesis 2: As the number of authoritarian patrons in a former rebel party's sponsorship network increases, so does the party's likelihood to participate and succeed in postsettlement elections.

Democratic Patrons and Authoritarian Partnerships

Aside from micromanagement, several democracies actively engage in sponsorship through authoritarian partners.[6] In these situations, democracies maintain plausible deniability by providing a buffer between the bad behavior of their assets and their political survival at home. Furthermore, these arrangements provide a level of protection from adverse selection on part of the populace a democratic patron attempts to mobilize. These partnerships allow the democracy to invest in macrolevel political institutions and voter education, while also pursuing the success of acceptable candidates, growing out of interim positions into favorable personalities and political labels. Many times these personalities are exiled assets never involved in the civil war or loosely connected to a preferred political movement, entering politics only after peace (Carothers 2006; Coyne 2008). Chabal and Daloz (1999) and LeBas (2011) refer to these candidates as "recycled elites" who set up mechanisms of upward mobility directly tied to elite–mass party success. The democratic patron gets stability and the illusion of democratization, while the authoritarian patron produces a political protégé within these institutions. Additionally, these partnerships provide former rebel parties a diversified portfolio of both revenue and human capital to be used in their development. However, the ability of these protégé organizations to participate regularly and succeed in elections will likely be conditional upon the regime characteristics of the partnership.

Much like democracies, authoritarian regimes have incentives to replicate themselves (Fish 2005; Schedler 2006; Vanderhill 2013). However, authoritarian leaders have additional incentives to build hegemonic parties in imposed democratic polities and weaken democratic institutions (Huntington 1965; Ishiyama 2001; Fish 2005; Schedler 2006). Likewise, all political parties have incentives to collectivize resources that maximize their position in politics, whether through hegemony or through strategic coalition building (Janda 1980; Panebianco 1988). Authoritarian patronage provides long-term access to these resources as well as the accumulation of important skills for maximizing a party's control in postconflict systems, regardless of who manages the political party (Hale 2006; Vanderhill 2013). Additionally, former rebel labels do not only rely on external revenue streams but also on training that helps to develop human capital. Depending on the level of executive constraints, each authoritarian regime has different things to offer a budding rebel party. Some can cover the patrimonial and infrastructural costs of forming a new and viable political label (Vanderhill 2013). Other regimes can provide the organizational skills and managerial norms required for strong party development (Kalyvas and Ballcells 2010). Partnerships between different regime

types should lead to a diversified portfolio of external revenues and administrative skillsets, thus leading to more viable rebel-to-party transformations.

> **Hypothesis 3:** Rebel parties sponsored by a partnership of democratic and authoritarian patrons will be more viable in postsettlement politics than those backed only by democracies or no one.

Monarchies face executive constraints connected to authoritarian power sharing and transparency (Herb 1999; Finer 1999; Svolik 2012). Although dynastic regimes are relatively stable governments, they rely on patronage and less so organizational skills. In many monarchical governments, patronage systems undergo maximum institutionalization, where the worth of a leader is dependent upon the accruement of personal wealth by key family members and their perception of the distribution of state resources (Herb 1999). On the other hand, elite specialization is determined by bloodline: certain families become military/intelligence officers, while others become dignitaries or heads of state. Therefore, royal families institutionalize accounting and transparency procedures to track the distribution of wealth as well as the allocation of state wealth toward foreign policy (Gorlizki and Khleniuk 2004; Svolik 2012). These institutions include royal parliaments and councils that investigate resource allocation, informing decisions associated with leadership placement and lines of succession (Finer 1999; Svolik 2012). In essence, every dime spent on developing a former rebel party is one less that can be given to a valuable royal elite.

Unlike monarchies, military regimes can provide clients' important skills associated with formalistic organizational structures and strategies that may sustain a rebel's political relevance. In these regimes, upward mobility to the inner echelons of power requires merit-based promotion over long periods of time, commanding respect and responsibility from superiors and subordinates alike. These formal structures set up clearly defined rules, principles, and power relationships between officials and lower-level cadres. However, military dictatorships face considerable executive constraints, primarily due to high risk of turnovers. Their tenure, especially in the case of "caretaker governments," is often considered ad hoc: part of a stabilization process that will eventually lead to a succession of leadership (Barros 2002; Svolik 2012). These regimes mobilize resources to sustain power through a coalition of specialized elites (Barros 2002) but also appropriately purge and reshuffle subordinates that pose a threat (Blaydes 2010). In order to sustain their tenure, military dictators are often masters of political theater, manufacturing security threats as a means of extending their status in government (Stanley 1996; Svolik 2012). In order to remain relevant after their tenure, many military dictators institutionalize highly specialized councils of elites as monitors who can reinstitute martial law (Hale 1994; Svolik 2012).

Personalist dictators have the fewest executive constraints on their power, allowing them to pursue risk-acceptant foreign policy strategies. Chief of which is their ability to allocate substantial amounts of monetary capital without formal regulations or budgetary oversight (Gorlizki and Khleniuk 2004; Svolik 2012). As

discussed earlier, money is essential for the transformation of most rebel party labels following a negotiated settlement. This is especially the case in neopatrimonial societies where new party labels are at an increased disadvantage: having programmatic appeals that are not yet connected to the state apparatus (Helmke and Levitsky 2004; Hale 2006; Carothers 2006; LeBas 2011). Rebels often lose their access to lucrative resources they've captured during the civil war and must also transition wartime capabilities to a posture of peace and party development. Robust cash flows from unabridged authoritarian sponsors can be used to overcome these steep costs of entry, allowing new parties to compete in patrimonial politics without access to captured resources or the state apparatus. Personalist patrons also project their image through public relations campaigns often associated with postconflict assistance (see Vandermill 2013).[7] Although these campaigns provide new rebel parties the infrastructure and monetary capital to succeed in postconflict politics, they are likely limited in human capital development. These campaigns are also connected to personality cultism, fortifying personalities in their client organizations that boost their outward appearance (Svolik 2012; Vanderhill 2013).

Single-party patrons operate in systems with increased executive constraints that can limit risk-acceptant foreign policy behavior but are most likely to provide organizational skill sets to new political parties. In the complex and fluid environments of political transition following the cold war, organizations with these Marxist–Leninist and/or dominant-party backgrounds were generally more efficient in party systems undergoing democratization (Kitschelt 1994; Ishiyama 1999, 2001; Fish 2005). Indeed, a substantial part of their success was an authoritarian past, but also support from a sponsorship network of elites asserting their will upon these new democratic reforms (Fish 2005; Hale 2006; Svolik 2012).

Organizations with these authoritarian pasts' utilized *Leninist technologies* or administrative skills centered at the management of elites and rank and file members (see Huntington 1965; Kitschelt 1994; Ishiyama 1999, 2001; Kalyvas and Ballcells 2010). These *vanguard organizations* also benefited from the support of other dominant-party regimes whose survival is connected to regime replication (Fish 2005; Vanderhill 2013).[8] These organizational skills include competitive internal party elections used as tools of recruitment, upward mobility, and elite shuffles. In essence, competitive authoritarianism provides parties long-term organizational development, forcing elites to accumulate experience through an extensive political periphery before achieving real political power (Geddes 1999; Gandhi 2008; Vogel 2011; Svolik 2012). Although these systems often provide preferential treatment to party elites, this competition also provides quality control (Huntington 1965; Levitsky and Way 2010), disrupting elite-led racketeering and corruption through politburos and specialized committees (Miller 2008; Huang 2008). Unlike personalist and monarchist regimes, elites are chosen based on competitiveness in a merit-based power structure, requiring the channels of succession to be relatively broad (Geddes 1999; Svolik 2012). These mobile power structures allow for orderly leadership transitions, reducing the likelihood of usurpation (Geddes 1999; Nathan 2003;

Li 2010; Svolik 2012). Lastly, single-party patrons are *resilient*, surviving economic and political crises as well as opposition from political organizations and military coups (Geddes 1999; Magaloni 2006, 2008; Brownlee 2007; Svolik 2012). Even when dominant-party regimes undergo democratization, the authoritarian party is often capable of remaining politically relevant and powerful (Ishiyama 2001; Gryzmala-Busse 2002; Fish 2005; Hale 2006). The resiliency of these regimes means that patrons in power are capable of keeping a constant flow of external revenue and human capital to their clients.

> **Hypothesis 4:** Rebel parties sponsored by single-party patrons will more likely participate and succeed in postsettlement political systems than those sponsored by other authoritarian or democratic patrons or no one.

Design

Data were constructed using the Uppsala-PRIO Conflict Data and Peace Agreement (UCDPA) data projects (Wallensteen and Pettersen 2014). Unlike one-sided victories, negotiated settlements provide rebel organizations a choice to transform, merge, dissolve, and/or return to armed struggle. Therefore, the scope of this study is limited to negotiated settlements that led to at least one election following the end of the civil war from 1979 to 2014; the UCDPA identifies sixty-nine settlements and 112 rebel signatories meeting this criteria. This sample was then merged with the Nonstate Actor Database (NSAD) and then disaggregated by foreign supporters with explicit connections to the organization during the civil war (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2011). The data are structured as election panels following a negotiated settlement, consisting of 397 unbalanced election panels across fifty countries and 109 rebel organizations that signed a negotiated settlement or adhered to settlement provisions, forming the unit of analysis: organization–election year.

Dependent Variable

This piece uses Janda's (1980) definition of a political party to analyze the two determinants of new party viability. The first is *participation* or the organization's pursuit of placing avowed candidates into governing roles through electoral competition. This binary variable equals "1" when a rebel party actively participates in an electoral competition and equals "0" when an organization boycotts, does not participate, or participates in a merger as part of another party's political label.[9] Participation measures whether or not a party actively competed in each election after a civil war; hence, a party organization that participates in the first election but does not in the second receives a 1 in the first election panel and a 0 in the second.

The second measure of rebel party viability is successful accumulation of *power*. Power measures the result of a party's participation in national elections and whether

the party adequately placed its avowed representatives into governing positions (Janda 1980). Power is a binary variable that equals 1 when a rebel party controls at least one branch of government after elections end and 0 otherwise. Power can be control of the presidency, prime ministership, a ministerial portfolio as part of a governing coalition, or 50 percent + 1 control of an upper or lower house of a national legislature.

All participation and power data were garnered from several election archives and encyclopedia resources of political parties. Manning and Smith (2016) supply the emergence data for rebel signatories in the first elections following the end of a civil war. For organizations that participate during later elections, I used a political party encyclopedia: *Political Parties of the World* (Sagar 2009) and three election databases: the Democratic Electoral Systems data (Golder and Borman 2013), the African Election Database (Nohlen, Krennerich, and Thibaut 2012), and the Inter-Parliamentary Union–PARLINE (IPU-PARLINE, henceforth) election archive (Table 1).

Foreign Sponsorship

Foreign sponsorship is operationalized using several variables all of which were measured using the NSAD, the Polity IV data, and the Autocratic Regime Breakdown and Transition Data. To test Hypothesis 1, this piece uses an aggregate binary variable where a party with any explicit foreign sponsor equals 1 and a party with no explicit foreign sponsors receives a 0. About 14 percent of the sample has no foreign sponsor or lost their foreign sponsor during the election panel(s).

To examine Hypothesis 2, this piece utilizes Salehyan, Wood, and Siroky's (2014) methodology of measuring foreign influence. Salehyan, Wood, and Siroky (2014) argue that very few rebel groups are sponsored by one country; instead, there are networks of patrons and/or strategic partnerships between the countries that sponsor rebel groups. To account for the effects of these networks and partnerships without bias, Salehyan, Wood, and Siroky (2014) standardize the effect of each patron as part of the collective. This creates a percentage-based measurement for each observation. Testing Hypothesis 2 requires this piece to calculate the percentage of autocratic influence among the network of patrons that sponsor a client.

$$\frac{\# \text{ of authoritarian patrons}}{\text{total foreign patrons}} = \text{authoritarian influence}.$$

This authoritarian patron score was calculated for every party and every election year to account for sponsor regime changes as well as contractual changes between patrons and clients. The determination between which patrons were democratic or autocratic in a given year was constructed from the Polity IV data. The Polity IV data consist of a scale from −10 to 10, where state regime type is dictated by the presence of certain institutions (Marshall and Jaggers 2014). Therefore, patrons whose

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Variables.

Variables	Mean	Range
Participation	0.761	0.00–1.00
Power accumulation	0.468	0.00–1.00
Foreign sponsorship	0.848	0.00–1.00
% Authoritarian patrons	0.610	0.00–1.00
Authoritarian capital	1.028	0.00–4.00
Democratic patron	0.242	0.00–1.00
Single-party patron	0.397	0.00–1.00
Militarist patron	0.085	0.00–1.00
Personalist patron	0.477	0.00–1.00
Monarch patron	0.065	0.00–1.00
Inclusiveness	3.030	0.00–9.00
Mobilization capacity	1.816	0.00–3.00
Prewar origins	0.271	0.00–1.00
Prewar democracy	0.208	0.00–1.00
UN peacekeeping	0.596	0.00–1.00
Average district magnitude	1.307	0.00–4.82
Electoral list structure	0.540	0.00–1.00
Electoral cycle	3.359	0.00–20.00
Ethnic fractionalization	0.539	0.00–0.91
Oil and gas exports	7.993	0.00–26.77
Inequality	3.982	1.43–5.03
War duration	4.326	2.48–6.60

governments operate at a Polity IV score of $x \leq 5$ are considered authoritarian influences and are added up as such. In 1992, UNITA was sponsored by six democracies and three autocrats, resulting in an authoritarian patron score of 0.3333. In 2008, UNITA had the support of one democracy and five autocrats, resulting in an authoritarian patron score of 0.8333.

To test Hypotheses 3 and 4, I use the ARBT data (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2015). These data provide five substantive typologies of a patron's regime: *single-party regimes, personalist dictatorships, monarchies, military dictatorships, and nonautocratic regimes*. To test Hypothesis 3, ARBT data are operationalized into a five-point additive scale of total authoritarian capital. Therefore, if a rebel party has one personalist patron and four monarchical patrons, the observation will receive a value of 2, because there are only two different types of authoritarian capitals present among the sponsors. This scaled variable is interacted with a binary democratic patron variable:

$$\text{monarch patron}_{(0,\,1)} + \text{militarist patron}_{(0,1)} + \text{personalist patron}_{(0,1)}$$
$$+ \text{ single-party patron}_{(0,1)} = \text{ authoritarian capital}_{(0,4)}.$$
$$\text{authoritarian capital}_{(0,\,4)} \times \text{democratic patron}_{(0,\,1)}.$$

To test Hypothesis 4, each sponsor regime typology remains disaggregated into five dummy variables, where the base category is no foreign sponsorship in a given panel. To account for the effect of individual partnerships between democratic patrons and each of the different authoritarian patrons, this piece utilizes several more interaction variables including:

$$\text{monarch patron}_{(0,1)} \times \text{democratic patron}_{(0,1)}.$$

$$\text{militarist patron}_{(0,1)} \times \text{democratic patron}_{(0,1)}.$$

$$\text{personalist patron}_{(0,1)} \times \text{democratic patron}_{(0,1)}.$$

$$\text{single-party patron}_{(0,1)} \times \text{democratic patron}_{(0,1)}.$$

Control Variables

This piece uses twelve control variables to account for organizational legacy, electoral institutions, and the general political environment. This piece also utilizes a lagged dependent variable for the participation models of the empirical analysis.

Organizational legacy is measured by three control variables: wartime mobilization capacity, prewar political origins, and experience with prewar democracy. Mobilization capacity is measured utilizing the NSA data, an ordinal variable accounting for the ability of an organization to recruit new members, muster members for military action, and organize effective resistance (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2011). Prewar political origins is a dichotomous variable where "1" affirms rebel ties to a legal political party during the prewar period and "0" records otherwise (Manning and Smith 2016). The mean of the sample (0.27) suggests that few organizations can trace their lineage to an established prewar political party. Prewar democracy is a dichotomous variable that measures whether or not the government at the time of civil war onset was democratic. Using the Polity IV data, states whose institutional scores of 6 or greater are assigned the value of "1" and assigned "0" otherwise. The mean of the sample (0.20) suggests that very few organizations have experience with democratic institutions prior to civil war, which according to some will decrease their likelihood to enter party politics following conflict.

There are four electoral institutions that are controlled for in this study: district magnitude, ballot structure, electoral cycle, and inclusiveness. These data of national electoral institutions and elections were collected using the IPU-PARLINE, the African Election Database (Nohlen, Krennerich, and Thibaut 2012), and information from *Political Parties of the World* (Sagar 2009). Log average district magnitude (ADM, henceforth) is a continuous variable from 0 (single member districts) to 4.812 (multimember districts). ADM has a mean of 1.306, suggesting that most rebels entering the data experience elections with midline district magnitudes in

PR systems. Ballot structure is a dichotomous variable, where lists that require candidate recruitment (open-list PR or first-past-the-post plurality) equal 0 and closed national lists equal 1. The mean suggests that about 55 percent of the sample has experience with closed national party lists. Electoral cycle is operationalized using the number of years between the negotiated settlement and the first election as well as the number of years between national elections, thereafter. Electoral cycle is a continuous variable with a range of 0 to 20 with a mean of 3.395. Although the mode is a cycle of five years between elections, much of the sample is skewed to less than four years preparation for elections. Political inclusion is measured using Marshall and Ishiyama's (2016) data on the total number of rebel labels that are legally able to enter postsettlement elections. The number of rebel party labels ranges from 0 to 9 with a mean of 3, other rebel party labels included in postconflict elections.

This piece uses several control variables to account for the general sociopolitical environment following a cessation of hostilities including war weariness, social cleavages, and resource dependency. To measure war weariness, I use civil war duration from the UCDPA. Civil war duration is operationalized into a logged continuous variable of the number of months from an organization's conflict onset to the signing of a negotiated settlement. The range of this logged variable is from 2.48 to 6.59 with a mean of 4.32. An important variable to consider following conflict resolution is the presence of a UNPKO. Fortna's (2008) *Peace Keeping Operation and Performance* and Brandt et al.'s (2011) extension are used to measure the presence of an international peacekeeping force into a dichotomous control variable whose mean of 0.596 suggests that many of these elections take place following devastating civil wars (Mason et al 2011). To measure income and infrastructure inequality, I utilize logged infant mortality rate. Aside from measuring the infrastructure capabilities of a state, infant mortality rate also provides information as to the level of poverty and discontent of the populace toward the status quo (Brandt et al. 2011). Logged infant mortality rate is a continuous variable utilizing World Bank Data on human development with a range of 1.43 to 5.03. Ethnic fractionalization is measured as a continuous variable using the Alesina et al. (2003) fractionalization data. Ethnic fractionalization has a range of 0 to 0.908 with a mean of 0.538. Resource dependency has been linked to conflict resumption and the deterioration of political institutions and parties (Basedau and Lay 2009; Ross 2012). The resource dependency variable uses a logged indicator of oil and natural gas revenue as the percentage of gross domestic product per purchasing power (Ross 2012). This variable has a range of 0 to 26.771 and a mean of about 8.

Empirical Analysis

Due to the binary nature of the party viability variables, the proposed statistical model is a binary logit. Table 2 presents analyses of rebel party viability in postsettlement politics, displaying odds ratios, robust-clustered standard errors, and statistical significance reported at the 90 percent (^), 95 percent (*), 99 percent (**),

Table 2. Binary Logit Analyses of Rebel Party Viability.

Variable	Electoral Participation Models					Power Accumulation Models		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Foreign sponsorship	10.22***(0.57)				3.18(0.75)			
% Authoritarian patrons						4.35***(0.43)		
Authoritarian capital		4.98***(0.39)	4.73***(0.44)				1.96*(0.34)	
Democratic patron × authoritarian capital			0.98(0.54)				0.52(0.42)	
Democratic patron			1.79(0.55)	1.91(0.56)			0.86(0.57)	1.03(0.58)
Monarchy patron				9.59(2.1)				0.33(0.75)
Militarist patron				1.99(1.3)				1.36(0.86)
Personalist patron				4.25***(0.49)				1.35(0.42)
Single-party regime patron				6.60***(0.54)				3.39***(0.47)
Democratic patron × personalist patron				0.63(0.99)				0.82(0.60)
Democratic patron × single-party patron				0.40(1.3)				0.19*(0.71)
Mobilization capacity	1.58(0.27)	1.80*(0.28)	1.33(0.28)	1.48(0.30)	1.69***(0.16)	1.53*(0.18)	1.59*(0.19)	1.52^(0.22)
Prewar origins	1.68(0.51)	2.11(0.45)	2.24(0.49)	2.11(0.48)	1.27(0.41)	1.45(0.36)	1.49(0.38)	1.56(0.38)
Prewar democracy	2.04(0.61)	1.14(0.47)	1.71(0.55)	1.96(0.57)	0.67(0.39)	0.55^(0.35)	0.64(0.37)	0.57(0.38)
District magnitude	1.00(0.13)	1.03(0.15)	1.01(0.15)	0.98(0.15)	1.00(0.11)	1.01(0.12)	1.01(0.12)	0.94(0.11)
Ballot structure	1.67(0.38)	2.59***(0.36)	2.12*(0.36)	2.02(0.39)	0.81(0.44)	1.13(0.36)	0.97(0.40)	0.90(0.41)
Electoral cycle	1.18*(0.08)	1.12(0.08)	1.13*(0.08)	1.13(0.09)	1.11*(0.05)	1.10(0.05)	1.07(0.04)	1.07(0.04)
Political inclusion	0.98(0.10)	0.97(0.10)	0.97(0.11)	0.97(0.11)	1.18*(0.08)	1.14^(0.07)	1.10(0.09)	1.08(0.09)
Inequality	0.97(0.31)	0.96(0.30)	0.89(0.35)	0.96(0.37)	0.99(0.19)	1.07(0.19)	1.11(0.21)	1.35(0.26)
Ethnic fractionalization	5.28(1.02)	2.95(0.99)	4.65(0.92)	6.41*(0.87)	2.36(0.72)	1.49(0.64)	1.89(0.66)	2.21(0.69)
Resource dependency	1.00(0.02)	1.00(0.02)	0.98(0.02)	0.98(0.02)	1.00(0.01)	1.01(0.01)	1.00(0.01)	1.00(0.01)

(continued)

Table 2. (continued)

Variable	Electoral Participation Models				Power Accumulation Models			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
War duration	1.34(0.24)	1.23(0.21)	1.23(0.22)	1.25(0.23)	1.02(0.18)	1.05(0.13)	1.11(0.15)	1.16(0.17)
UN peacekeeping	2.01(0.43)	2.57***(0.42)	2.02*(0.42)	2.16*(0.41)	1.60(0.35)	1.95*(0.31)	2.02^(0.37)	2.04^(0.37)
Electoral participation$_{(t-1)}$	10.87***(0.40)	11.36***(0.36)	10.98***(0.39)	11.02***(0.42)				
Constant	0.001***(1.9)	0.005***(1.7)	0.007*(2.0)	0.003**(2.0)	0.03***(1.25)	0.02***(1.20)	0.02**(1.3)	0.01***(1.5)
N	397	397	397	375	397	397	397	392
Pseudo R^2	.39	.37	.41	.41	.12	.15	.14	.17

Note: Statistical significance reported at the 90 percent (^), 95 percent (*), 99 percent (**) and 99.5 percent (***)

Figure 1. Predictive margins of rebel party viability.

and 99.5 percent (***) confidence levels.[10] Models 1 to 4 test rebel party viability through the participation dependent variable, and models 5 to 8 test through the power accumulation dependent variable. Figures 1 and 2 provide substantive postestimation analyses of the sponsor network interaction between different foreign patrons.

In the statistical models, only three of the twelve control variables achieve statistical significance in both the participation and power accumulation models. A rebel group's ability to recruit and mobilize people during warfare transfers into positive political characteristics during the peace. Rebels with high mobilization capacity were associated with an 80 percent increased likelihood of participating in electoral contests. Remarkably, mobilization capacity during the war is also synonymous with a 53 percent to 69 percent increased likelihood of achieving political power through an electoral competition. The presence of UNPKO is widely associated with rebel party viability throughout the postconflict period, increasing the likelihood of participation by 102 percent to 157 percent and the likelihood of accumulating power by 95 percent to 104 percent. Lastly, as the amount of time between elections increases, rebel party viability also increases by 11 percent to 18 percent in postconflict politics.

Two other control variables achieved statistical significance in Table 2. Ballot structure appears to be associated with former rebel party participation, and political inclusiveness is associated with the likelihood of power accumulation. Systems with closed national lists were 112 percent to 159 percent more likely to see rebels

Figure 2. Predictive margins of rebel party viability.

participate in the political process than those with open list or candidate list systems. Despite inclusiveness of a negotiated settlement increasing the likelihood of rebel accumulation of power by 18 percent, increases in the number of legal rebel parties allowed to run in elections have a marginal negative effect on participation.

None of the remaining control variables achieve statistical significance in the models below. Although rebel expertise with prewar party systems has been tied to rebel party emergence in the first elections following a civil war (Manning and Smith 2016), this effect appears to be statistically insignificant in continued participation and power accumulation over time. Likewise, rebel party experience with prewar democratic institutions appears to have a positive but statistically insignificant role in participation over time. On the other hand, experience with prewar democratic institutions has a substantively negative effect on a rebel party's accumulation of power (see Kitschelt 1994; Ishiyama 2001; Fish 2005). War duration and ethnic heterogeneity are associated with consistently positive but statistically insignificant roles in rebel party viability following negotiated settlements. District magnitude, inequality, and resource dependency have almost no substantive effect on the likelihood of rebel parties participating in elections or placing avowed candidates in positions of power.

According to Hypothesis 1, foreign sponsorship provides access to political opportunities important for new political parties; thus, parties with foreign sponsors should be consistently viable in postconflict elections. To test this hypothesis, models 1 and 5 provide binary logit analyses of rebel party participation and power accumulation, respectively. The findings suggest that foreign-sponsored parties fair better in the opportunity to compete in postconflict elections but do not necessarily have the means to succeed in those electoral competitions. Model 1 finds that rebel parties with foreign sponsorship are substantially more likely to emerge and consistently participate in postsettlement elections, an effect that is statistically significant at the 99.5 percent level. Model 5, on the other, had suggest that foreign-sponsored rebel parties may not be particularly better off to accumulate governing power in the elections they participate in. Despite a substantively positive relationship with power accumulation, the effect of foreign sponsorship is statistically insignificant.

A large part of this piece argues that the substantive power of foreign sponsorship is associated with the rational and institutional constraints the potential patrons face when deciding whether or not a client party receives access to external revenues. Hypothesis 2 suggests that authoritarian patrons are less constrained and thereby more risk acceptant than their democratic counterparts (Putnam 1988), thus as the percentage of authoritarian patrons in a party's sponsor network increase, so should the viability of the rebel party label. Models 2 and 6 test Hypothesis 2. Both models find resounding substantive support and statistical support at the 99.5 percent level for Hypothesis 2.

According to Hypotheses 3 and 4, some patrons choose to engage in partnerships in an attempt to minimize audience costs, while also providing their clients the

sponsorship they need to remain viable. Different patrons provide different amounts and types of financial and human capitals depending on the institutions that constrain them. Testing these hypotheses requires several interaction terms, which substantially inflate the statistical significance of the interaction variables and their constituent parts in binary logit analyses (Easery, Berry, and DeMerrit 2010). In order to test the significance of these variables, this piece uses marginal effects postestimation to measure the substantive effect of the interaction terms on the probability of change in the dependent variable at different values.

Figure 1 provides the predictive marginal effects estimation for models 3 and 7, which test the effect of an interaction between a democratic patron and an additive scale of different types of authoritarian capitals. Models 3 and 7 find that rebel parties receiving authoritarian capital are substantially more likely to participate regularly in postsettlement elections and are 96 percent more likely to achieve real political power in those elections. Figure 1 affirms these results but also suggests that statistical and substantive significance of this variable may be somewhat inflated. Figure 1 also suggests that although a partnership between a democratic patron and an authoritarian patron yields statistically and substantively significant positive results in the participation models, the relationship is largely determined by the authoritarian patron variable. A party with a democratic patron is better off than one without a sponsor, but democratic patrons have little to no effect on participation when partnered with authoritarian regimes. On the other hand, the predictive margins test of model 7 shows those parties with authoritarian capital are substantively associated with the accumulation of real political power. Even when a party is sponsored by maximum authoritarian capital, having a democratic sponsor negatively affects its likelihood of accumulating political power. Furthermore, a party with only democratic sponsors is no more successful than a party without foreign sponsorship in this regard.

Models 4 and 8 provide tests of Hypothesis 4 by analyzing the effect of different authoritarian patrons as well as their partnerships with democratic sponsors on party viability. In model 4, the only variables that reach statistical significance are single-party regime patrons and personalist dictatorship patrons. In model 8, only single-party patrons remain statistically and substantively associated with a political party's accumulation of political power. However, the postestimation conducted in figure 2 finds that the 99.5 percent statistical significance in models 4 and 8 are highly inflated. Single-party regime patrons remain statistically and substantively significant in model 4, and personalist patrons attain marginal significance in postestimation. Despite their positive and massive substantive effect on rebel party participation, both monarchic and militarist effects decreased substantially in the power accumulation model. Parties with military dictators as sponsors were only 3 percent more likely to achieve political power, whereas those financed by monarchies were 67 percent less likely.[11]

Much like figure 1, figure 2 provides evidence that the presence of a democratic patron has little substantive effect on rebel party participation but dramatically

diminishes the statistical effect of the interaction term. On the other hand, figure 2 also finds that individual authoritarian sponsorship though positively associated with power accumulation is statistically and substantively insignificant. Furthermore, figure 2 suggests that this positive correlation between authoritarian patrons and party success disappears when partnerships with democratic patrons occur. Despite their increased viability to participate in postconflict elections, parties with democratic patrons are associated with a dramatic decrease in the likelihood of political power from these elections. The results from figures 1 and 2 dramatically question the effectiveness of democratic sponsorship of political parties abroad and provide some support for the notion that former rebel parties financed and trained by single-party regimes and personalist dictators are better equipped to become viable political labels in postconflict elections.

Conclusions

This piece sought to understand a simple, yet important puzzle in the study of political development following a civil war: why do some rebel organizations remain politically relevant as political parties after negotiated settlements, while others do not despite having similar incentives to do so. Previous work provided information as to the costs of becoming political parties after a civil war and to the rational decisions of leadership to enter politics yet did not present a causal argument for why some rebels consistently compete and succeed while others lie dormant or die in obscurity. Utilizing the principal–agent model and the two-level game, this piece sought to understand how rational and institutional constraints of individual patrons affect the viability of rebel party clients in postsettlement political systems.

The findings suggest mixed support for Hypothesis 1. This piece finds that former rebel organizations with foreign sponsorship are far more likely to remain politically active in postconflict elections than those without sponsorship. However, this variable has no effect on a rebel party's accumulation of power in those elections. These results suggest that not all foreign patrons are effective sponsors of rebel party development in the long term, supporting the need to disaggregate by patron characteristics.

In this piece, foreign sponsorship was also disaggregated by patron regime type, accounting for opportunities arising from different combinations of patron networks and/or partnerships. The empirical analyses find strong support for Hypothesis 2. As the number of autocratic patrons increases, so did a rebel party's likelihood of viability in postsettlement politics. Not only were rebel parties more active in postconflict elections, they were also substantially more effective at gaining access to governing majorities, ministerial portfolios, and/or presidential office. The empirical analyses find marginal support for Hypothesis 3. Although partnerships between democratic patrons and autocratic patrons yield higher levels of party viability, postestimation suggests that autocratic patrons are responsible for the overwhelming majority of the substantive and statistical effect. Democratic patrons also substantially decrease the probability a former rebel party accumulates political power, even

when they are partnered with authoritarian patrons. Despite having a positive effect on electoral participation, former rebel parties with democratic patrons are no more likely to accumulate power than those operating without foreign sponsorship. Lastly, the empirical analyses find strong statistical and substantive support for Hypothesis 4. Of all the regime types, former rebel parties were most viable when they were sponsored by dominant, single-party regimes. Although rebel parties receiving sponsorship from personalist patrons were statistically and substantively associated with rebel party participation, they were not associated with power accumulation in those elections.

The results also suggest that access to external revenues carries rebel parties only so far in postconflict politics and that the relationship between foreign sponsorship and rebel party development is far from ironclad. Rebel groups with transferable skills and organizational capacity during the civil war were likely to become viable political parties in postsettlement elections. The piece also finds that postsettlement states with UNPKO are conducive to increased viability; thus, rebel groups that have fewer security concerns are more likely to develop. Ultimately, rebel parties need human capital development, rebranding, and restructuring to be effective political organizations after negotiated settlements. Additionally, there remain several limitations that provide avenues of future research. First, this piece does not account for the autonomy of former rebel parties, which is particularly important in studying the effectiveness of proxy organizations (Eck 2015). Additionally, the results do not account for the level of connectedness between the organization and the population (Weinstein 2007). Both of these factors are likely to be essential in judging whether these client parties are truly dependent agents of a foreign power or truly beholden to their constituents. Second, this piece rationalizes authoritarianism and does not account for the potentially disastrous strategies these parties can adopt from their sponsors (Svolik 2012; Salehyan, Wood, and Siroky 2014). These factors are particularly important in understanding the repressive behaviors, staying power, and governance of these foreign-backed parties once they accumulate power and the state apparatus. The author hopes that this piece provides a new direction of collaboration between scholars of conflict resolution and comparative political systems.

Acknowledgments

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

Supplemental Material

Supplementary material for this article is available online.

Notes

1. According to Janda (1980, 5), "a political party is an organization that pursues a goal of placing its avowed representatives in government positions."
2. For specific case examples, see Dayton and Kreisberg (2009) and Allison and Alvarez (2011).
3. Saint-Germain and Chavez-Metoyer (2009) focus on the mobilization of Non-government organizations (NGOs) by Farabundo Marti Liberacion Nacional (FMLN), Unidad Revolucionaria de Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG), and Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN). In El Salvador and Nicaragua, gender politics became a central issue following the civil war as the number of femicides and infant mortalities exponentially increased influencing presidential elections in both countries. Using these NGOs, rebel party provisions for women and children helped mobilize previously untapped constituencies.
4. UCPN-Maoists in Nepal and FMLN in El Salvador were particularly efficient in rebranding themselves through candidate selection and party platform to win national elections (see Dayton and Kreisberg 2009; Allison and Alvarez 2011; Ishiyama and Marshall 2015). Other labels, such as URNG in Guatemala, reluctant to rebrand faced long drawn out deaths as more successful labels splintered from them rather than remain associated with the revolutionary label (see Allison 2009, 2016).
5. Indeed, when democratic governments are installed in regions classically controlled by despots, autocracies cooperatively gang up on imposed polities using political organizations as vehicles for change (see Greig and Enterline 2008).
6. Several of these partnerships have been widely successful. The United States with the help of Thailand successfully transformed and sustained viable political parties in Cambodia, including the Cambodian Peoples' Party and Community of Royalist Peoples'. Panama has also enjoyed successful partnerships with Ecuador, Cuba, and Venezuela to sustain FSLN into a hegemonic political party in Nicaragua. India and the UAE have enjoyed success developing the Balochistan Nationalist Party and the Muttahida Qaumi Movement in Pakistan.
7. Iran actively sponsored infrastructure projects in Lebanon through the political organizations of Hezbollah, Amal, and the Free Patriotic Movement following both the Israeli Occupation (2006) and the Cedar Revolution (2005–2008). Hugo Chavez engaged in similar projects in Nicaragua, funneling energy infrastructure and development aid through FSLN and several of its NGOs (see Sagar 2009; Vandermill 2013).

8. Even when ideologies and parties change, patrons from dominant-party systems have an incentive to secure single-party regimes elsewhere. United Russia under Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev invested massive resources into pro-Communist labels in Ukraine and Belarus as well as far-right parties in Western Europe.

9. Of the 109 rebel organizations that enter the quantitative models, fifty-nine (55 percent of the sample) become political parties for the first general election following negotiated settlements. Some of these parties remain constituent participants, while others become less viable over time. Some organizations (a total of seventeen) merge into preexisting/establishment political parties directly following negotiations; though these organizations are technically part of the political process, joining an established political party does not follow the definition of party emergence set by Janda (1980). The remaining organizations become active after a prolonged dormancy or fail to establish a viable party label: dissolving, becoming criminal enterprises, or returning to armed struggle.

10. Odds ratios provide the substantive strength of a variable's probability of producing a change in dependent variable. Odds ratios below 1.000 are considered to be a negative effect on the pr(Y), and ratios above are considered to be a positive effect on the pr(Y). Ratios that linger near 1.000 are considered to have little to no substantive effect on the dependent variable, despite their statistical significance. The binary logit analyses also report robust clustered standard errors because the panels are constructed as elections within states, which lead to inflated nested standard errors within the sample. Variance inflation factor (VIF) tests were conducted where all explanatory variables scored less than 2, finding no perfect correlation except in models using interaction terms.

11. Partnerships between democratic patrons and monarchist or militarist dictator patrons were unable to be tested in models 4 and 8 as well as in postestimation in figure 2. This is likely associated with a regional patron bias: all of the monarchic sponsors and most of the militarist sponsors are located in the Middle East and North Africa.

References

Alesina, Alberto, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat, and Romain Wacziarg. 2003. "Fractionalization." *Journal of Economic Growth* 8 (June): 155-94.

Allison, Michael. 2009. "Opportunity Lost: The Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unit." In *Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding*, edited by Bruce Dayton and Louis Kriesberg, 188-203. New York: Routledge.

Allison, Michael. 2016. "The Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unit: The Long Collapse." *Democratization* 23 (6): 1042-58.

Allison, Michael, and Alberto M. Alvarez. 2011. "Unity and Disunity in the FMLN." *Latin American Politics and Society* 54 (4): 89-118.

Barros, Robert. 2002. *Constitutionalism and Dictatorship: Pinochet, the Junta, and the 1980 Constitution*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Basedau, Matthias, and Jann Lay. 2009. "Resource Curse or Rentier Peace? The Ambiguous Effects of Oil Wealth and Oil Dependence on Violent Conflict." *Journal of Peace Research* 46 (6): 757-76.

Berti, Benedetta. 2013. *Armed Political Organizations: From Conflict to Integration*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Berti, Benedetta, and Beatriz Gutierrez. 2016. "Rebel-to-political and Back? Hamas as a Security Provider in Gaza between Rebellion, Politics and Governance." *Democratization* 23 (6): 1059-76.

Blaydes, Lisa. 2010. *Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Brandt, Patrick, T. David Mason, Mehmet Gurses, and Jason Quinn. 2011. "When Civil Wars Recur: Conditions for Durable Peace After Civil War." *International Studies Perspectives* 12 (2): 171-89.

Brownlee, Jason. 2007. *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Alastair Smith. 2012. *The Dictator's Handbook: Why Bad Behavior is Almost Always Good Politics*. New York: Public Affairs.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph Siverson, and James Bunce. 2003. *The Logic of Political Survival*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Cammett, Melani, and Edmund Malesky. 2012. "Power Sharing in Post-conflict Societies: Implications for Peace and Governance." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56 (6): 982-1016.

Carothers, Thomas. 2006. *Confronting the Weakest Link: Aiding Political Parties in New Democracies*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Chabal, Patrick, and Jean-Pascal Daloz. 1999. *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 1998. "On Economic Causes of Civil War." *Oxford Economic Papers* 50:563-73.

Coyne, Christopher J. 2008. *After War: The Political Economy of Exporting Democracy*. Redwood, CA: Stanford University Press.

Cunningham, David, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan. 2011. "Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups." *International Organization* 65 (4): 709-44.

Dayton, Bruce and Louis Kriesberg, eds. 2009. *Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding*. New York: Routledge.

De Zeeuw, Jeroen. 2007. *From Soldiers to Politicians: Transforming Rebel Movements After Civil War*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Downs, William 2011. "Electoral Systems in Comparative Perspective." In *21st Century Political Science: A Reference Handbook*, Vol. 1, edited by John T. Ishiyama and Marijke Breuning, 159-67. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Doyle, Michael, and Nicholas Sambanis. 2006. *Making War and Building Peace*: *United Nations Peace Operations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Easery, Justin, William Berry, and Jacqueline DeMerrit. 2010. "Testing for Interaction in Binary Logit and Probit Models: Is a Product Term Essential?" *American Journal of Political Science* 54 (1): 248-66.

Eck, Kristine. 2015. "Repression by Proxy: How Military Purges and Insurgency Impact the Delegation of Coercion." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59 (5): 924-46.

Finer, Samuel Edward. 1999. The History of Government from the Earliest Times: The Intermediate Ages. New York: Oxford University Press.

Fish, Steven. 2005. *Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Fortna, Virginia Paige. 2008. *Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil Wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Gandhi, Jennifer. 2008. *Political Institutions under Dictatorship*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Geddes, Barbara. 1999. "What Do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 2:115-44.

Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. 2015. "Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set." *Perspectives in Politics* 12 (2): 313-31.

Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede, and Michael Ward. 2006. "Diffusion and the International Context of Democratization." *International Organization* 60 (4): 911-33.

Gorlizki, Yoram, and Oleg Khlevniuk. 2004. *Cold Peace: Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle 1945–1953*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Greig, Michael, and Andrew Enterline. 2008. "Perfect Storms? Political Instability in Imposed Polities and the Futures of Iraq and Afghanistan." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52:880-915.

Greig, Michael, and Andrew Enterline. 2014. "The Durability of Imposed Polities." *International Interactions* 40 (2): 166-90.

Gryzmala-Busse, Anna. 2002. *Redeeming the Communist Past: The Regeneration of Communist Parties in East Central Europe*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Hale, Henry E. 2006. "Democracy or Autocracy on the march? The Color Revolutions as Normal Dynamics of Patronal Presidentialism." *Communist and Post-communist Studies* 39 (August): 305-29.

Hale, William. 1994. *Turkish Politics and the Military*. London, UK: Routledge.

Hartzell, Caroline, Matthew Hoddie, and Donald Rothchild. 2001. "Stabilizing the Peace after Civil War: An Investigation of Some Key Variables." *International Organization* 55 (Winter): 183-208.

Helmke, Gretchen, and Steven Levitsky. 2004. "Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Dilemma." *Perspectives on Politics* 2 (4): 725-40.

Herb, Michael. 1999. *All in the Family*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Huang, Jing. 2008. "Institutionalization of Political Succession in China: Progress and Implications." In *China's Changing Political Landscape*, edited by Cheng Li, 80-97. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Huntington, Samuel. 1965. "Political Development and Political Decay." *World Politics* 17 (3): 386-430.

Ishiyama, John. 1999. "Sickles into Roses: The Communist Successor Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Comparative Perspective." *Democratization* 6:52-73.

Ishiyama, John. 2001. "Party Organization and the Political Success of the Communist Successor Parties." *Social Science Quarterly* 82:844-64.

Ishiyama, John, and Anna Batta. 2011. "Swords into Plowshares: Rebel Legacies, Electoral Competition and the Transformation of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)." *Communist and Post-communist Studies* 4 (4): 369-79.

Ishiyama, John, and Michael C. Marshall. 2015. "Candidate Selection and Former Rebel Parties." *Party Politics* 21 (4): 591-602.

Ishiyama, John, and Michael C. Marshall. 2017. "What Explains Former Rebel Party Name Changes after a Civil Conflict Ends? External and Internal Factors and the Transition to Political Competition." (with John Ishiyama) *Party Politics* 23 (4): 364-75.

Janda, Kenneth. 1980. *Political Parties: A Cross-national Survey*. New York: Free Press.

Joshi, Madhav. 2013. "Inclusive Institutions and Stability of Transition toward Democracy in Post-civil War States." *Democratization* 20 (4): 743-70.

Joshi, Madhav, and John Darby. 2013. "Introducing the Peace Accords Matrix (PAM): A Database of Comprehensive Peace Agreements and their Implementation, 1989–2007." *Peacebuilding* 1 (2): 256-74.

Kalyvas, Stathis, and Laia Ballcells. 2010. "International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict." *American Political Science Review* 104 (3): 415-29.

Kitschelt, Herbert. 1994. *The Transformation of European Social Democracy*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Klapidor, Dominik. 2009. *From Rebels to Politicians. Explaining Rebel-to-Party Transformations after Civil War: The Case of Nepal*. London, UK: London School of Economic Working Papers.

LeBas, Adrienne. 2011. *From Protest to Parties: Party Building and Democratization in Africa*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan Way. 2010. *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Li, Cheng. 2010. "China's Communist Party-State: The Structure and Dynamics of Power" In *Politics of China: An Introduction*, edited by William Joseph, 165-91. New York: Oxford University Press.

Lijphart, Arendt. 1999. *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty Six Countries*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Lyons, Terrence. 2009. "Transforming Institutions of War." In *Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding: Moving from Violence to Sustainable Peace*, edited by Bruce Dayton and Louis Kriesberg, 91-106. New York: Routledge.

Magaloni, Beatriz. 2006. *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Magaloni, Beatriz. 2008. "Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule." *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (4): 715-41.

Mampilly, Zachariah. 2009. *Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life during War*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Manning, Carrie. 2008. *The Making of Democrats*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Manning, Carrie, and Ian Smith. 2016. "Political Party Formation by Former Armed Opposition Groups after Civil War." *Democratization* 23 (6): 972-89.

Marshall, Michael C., and John Ishiyama. 2016. "Does Transformation of Rebel Organizations into Political Parties Promote Durable Peace?" *Democratization* 23 (6): 1009-25.

Marshall, Monty G., and Keith Jaggers. 2014. "Polity IV Data Set User Manual." Accessed July 27, 2017, http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html.

McCubbins, Matthew, and Thomas Schwartz. 1984. "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms." *American Journal of Political Science* 28 (1): 165-79.

Meernik, James, and Seonjou Kang. 2005. "Civil War Destruction and the Prospects for Economic Growth." *Journal of Politics* 67:88-109.

Millar, T. B. 1980. "Conflict and Intervention." In *Conflict and Intervention in the Third World*, edited by M. Ayoob. London, UK: Croom Helm.

Miller, Alice 2008 "Institutionalization and the Changing Dynamics of Chinese Leadership Politics." In *China's Changing Political Landscape*, edited by Cheng Li, 61-79. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Nathan, Andrew. 2003. "Authoritarian Resilience." *Journal of Democracy* 14 (1): 6-17.

Nohlen, Dieter, Michael Krennerich, and Berhard Thibaut. 2012. *Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Panebianco, Angelo. 1988. *Political Parties: Organization and Power*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Putnam, Robert. 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." *International Organization* 42 (3): 427-60.

Reilly, Benjamin, and Per Nordlund. 2008. *Political Parties in Conflict-Prone Societies: Regulation, Engineering, and Democratic Development*. Tokyo, Japan: United Nations University Press.

Reynolds, Andrew, Ben Reilly, and Andrew Ellis. 2005. "Electoral System Design: The New International IDEA Handbook." International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Accessed July 27, 2017, http://www.idea.int/publications/esd/.

Ross, Michael L. 2012. *The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Russett, Paul, and John Oneal. 1999. "The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885–1992." *World Politics* 52 (1): 1-37.

Sagar, D. J. 2009. *Political Parties of the World*. Farmington, CT: John Harper.

Saint-Germain, Michele, and Cynthia Chavez-Metoyer. 2009. *Women Legislators in Central America*. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Salehyan, Idean. 2010. "The Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54 (3): 493-515.

Salehyan, Idean, Reed Wood, and David Siroky. 2014. "External Rebel Sponsorship and Civilian Abuse: A Principal-Agent Analysis of Wartime Atrocities." *International Organization* 98 (3): 663-61.

Schedler, Andreas. 2006. *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Sindre, Gyda Maras. 2014. "Internal Party Democracy in Former Rebel Parties." *Party Politics* 22 (4): 501-11.

Soderberg-Kovacs, Mimmi, and Sophia Hatz. 2016. "Rebel-to-Party Transformations in Civil War Peace Processes 1975-2011." *Democratization* 23 (6): 990-1008.

Stanley, William. 1996. *The Protection Racket State: Elite Politics, Military Extortion, and Civil War in El Salvador*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.

Svolik, Milan. 2012. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Vanderhill, Rachel. 2013. *Promoting Authoritarianism Abroad*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Vanneman, Peter, and Martin James. 1983. "Soviet Intervention in Angola: Intentions and Implications." *Strategic Review* 4 (Summer): 92-103.

Vogel, Ezra. 2011. *Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Wallensteen, Peter, and Therese Pettersson. 2014. "Armed Conflicts, 1946–2014." *Journal of Peace Research* 52 (4): 536-50.

Weinstein, Jeremy M. 2007. *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence*. New York: Cambridge University Press.